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Abstract—In this paper, we propose Joint Latch (JLatch) and
Joint Flip-Flop (JFF), two novel reconfigurable structures which
bring the reconfigurability of reliability to user latches and flip-
flops (FFs) in reconfigurable devices such as FPGAs. Specifically,
we implement two reconfigurable storage elements that exploit a
trade-off between reliability and amount of available resources.
In fault prone conditions, JLatch (or JFF) is configured in such
a way that four pre-selected normal static latches (or FFs) are
combined together at circuit level to form one hardened storage
cell. Solution focuses on transient faults such as soft errors,
where we show that critical charge is increased by at least
three orders of magnitude (1000X) to practically bring immunity
against any Single Event Upset (SEU). If four latches inside
an FPGA logic block are far enough, it can effectively cope
with Multiple Bit Upsets (MBUs) as well. Additionally, provided
that special transistor sizing is applied (only necessary for some
latch structures), JLatch and JFF take advantage of a novel self-
correcting technique to correct any single fault immediately. Our
solution provides reconfigurability of reliability with negligible
performance and area overhead with only one (two) extra tran-
sistor(s) per latch (FF). The delay of this technique is less than
the delay of conventional TMR (Triple Modular Redundancy)
technique with a majority voter at output.
Keywords: Reliability, reconfigurability, FPGA, hardening,
static latch, flip-flop.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, long time-to-market and costly design
process have made ASICs not to be affordable for designs
with limited production volume. Instead, using Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components is the prevalent approach,
where hardware systems based on commercial reconfigurable
devices (FPGAs) are widely used in industry. Although flex-
ibility of reconfigurability is the key benefit of FPGAs,
volatility is not free and comes with some costs, such as
more silicon area, delay, and power consumption [6]. Another
significant shortage is being less reliable when compared to
ASICs. This becomes important particularly for applications
with high reliability requirements which usually are produced
in low quantities, such as avionics, safety critical systems,
satellites, etc. Therefore, usage of FPGAs in these domains
is significantly limited and due to this, enhancing reliability
levels for FPGAs is always under spotlight [10].
Generally, FPGA architectures are island-style where a wide
variety of heterogeneous resources, including logic blocks, on-
chip block memories, I/O blocks and DSPs are connected via
routing switch boxes (Figure 1). Configuration memory bits
Fig. 1: Distribution of logic blocks, on-chip memory blocks,
routing switch matrices, and I/O blocks inside a generic FPGA
architecture.
which normally are not directly visible to user, specify how
reconfigurable fabric operates. An example for this invisible
configuration is the operation of switch boxes, where they need
to be set up to provide required connectivity among utilized
resources. SRAM-based FPGAs preserve configuration bits
inside volatile static memory bits (which are loaded to FPGA
every time at power up from an off-chip flash memory),
while a different approach is used in flash-based FPGAs,
where configuration is stored in none-volatile flash memory
bits to achieve less power consumption and more stability.
User design is mapped to several configurable logic blocks,
each contains a few read-only Look-Up Tables (LUTs) to
implement the combinational logic, and a set of user flip-flops
(FFs)/latches to implement sequential logic such as registers
and state machines. In this setup, user FFs/latches keep the
state of user circuit.
Any upset within FPGA configuration memory is especially
troublesome since it may change the operation of FPGA.
Nevertheless, since FPGA configuration is static and not
changing, configuration memory cells can be protected by
special techniques to reduce the reliability gap with ASICs.
However, state of user design or sequential logic which is
inside user FFs are vulnerable similar to ASICS. Adverse
extraneous factors like high energy particle strike or noise can
corrupt values of FFs. Fortunately, the flexible structure of
FPGAs permits using redundancy to bring more protection.
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In this paper, we propose Joint Latch (JLatch) and Joint
Flip-Flop (JFF), two novel hardening solutions. Specifically,
we implement reconfigurable storage elements that take ad-
vantage of the trade-off between FPGA user resource count
and fault resilience at a tunable granularity level. JLatch and
JFF are two simple low-overhead circuit ideas which join
together four pre-selected latches or FFs to make a single
but highly robust storage element when reliability becomes a
concern (e.g., in harsh environmental conditions). This work
is complementary to our previous work [2], which addressed
SRAM memories to be used in FPGA’s BRAMs and LUTs
(since both have SRAM structure [12], [13]), while the current
study addresses user latches and FFs. The main contributions
of this study are as follows:
• We implement hardened latch and FF to mitigate soft
errors in FPGAs where reliable mode practically pro-
vides full immunity against single event upsets (SEUs).
Moreover, it effectively copes with Multiple Bit Upsets
(MBUs). Additionally, provided that special transistor
sizing is applied (necessary for some latch structures), any
single fault is also automatically and instantly corrected.
• Our approach brings reconfigurability of reliability to user
latches and FFs with fine granularity, where it can only
be applied to required number of FPGA logic blocks.
This technique is particularly useful for reconfigurable
fabrics like commercial-grade FPGAs making them more
suitable for critical applications.
• JLatch and JFF are somewhat similar to prevalent hard-
ware redundancy techniques like TMR, but without any
explicit majority voter at output. Consequently, voter
failure is not a concern, and voter delay is not added
to the path delay.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we review some prominent existing solutions
concerning reliability enhancement in FPGAs. Historically,
hardening solutions for digital circuits are classified into three
categories [20]. In Radiation Hardening by Process (RHBP)
which we will not discuss in here, hardening is achieved
by none-conventional and expensive foundry processes with
using special materials. In Radiation Hardening by Design
(RHBD), reliability improvement is achieved by using addi-
tional transistors, special transistor spacing [7], circuit level
redundancy strategies such as DICE [3], etc, for customized
none-commercial chips built particularly for critical applica-
tions. In such designs, considerable overheads of area, power
and performance may be tolerated to achieve necessary relia-
bility which make them improper for commercial applications.
Moreover, increasing importance of MBU effect has made
some of such solutions ineffective [8]. In Radiation Harden-
ing by Architecture (RHBA), commercial parts are used in
redundant and duplicative configurations (in component level,
board level, or system level) to achieve the required level of
reliability.
Configuration memory bits, internal block memories, and
the state of user circuit inside sequential logic are typical
Fig. 2: A robust SRAM cell [2] implemented by combining
four SRAM cells like a ring (bit-lines and access transistors are
not shown). When CTRL=1, four cells form a single hardened
cell with internal data redundancy.
vulnerable parts of an FPGA. Any fault in configuration results
in corruption of FPGA operation (corruption of routings or
combinational functions) which mandates correction, for ex-
ample by reloading the configuration. In the case of sequential
logic, however, fault leads to a change in the state of circuit
where a circuit restart may become necessary. Some reliability
solutions are specifically applicable to configuration memories,
such as storing them on on-chip none-volatile flash memory
bits as in the flash-based FPGAs; or scrubbing which means
reloading the configuration memory periodically or on demand
to overwrite occasional errors [16]. In the case of internal
block memories, ECC is a common solution as it can be
effectively employed within any regular memory structure.
Because user FFs are individual storage cells with changing
value, above solutions are not applicable to them.
Studies about protecting FFs are mainly based on redun-
dancy techniques such as TMR. Some radiation-hardened
FPGAs use three FFs plus a dedicated voter to implement
TMR to have a single hardened FF [19]. Xilinx V5QV FPGA
[17] is a modified version of commercial-grade Virtex-5 FPGA
that incorporates RHBD technology to protect FPGA against
SEUs and achieve space qualification. As one can expect,
area overhead in RHBD techniques is significant. Xilinx’s
TMRTOOL [15], is a tool for automatic conversion of user
design into TMR version for protection against radiation in
commercial-grade FPGAs. The tool automatically triplicates
inputs, logics, and outputs and also inserts majority voters
with feedback loops to correct failures without programmer
intervention.
In our previous study [2], we proposed a reconfigurable
SRAM cell which trades-off reliability and memory size in
SRAMs (see Figure 2). Besides other applications such as
caches or register files, this technique is also applicable to
LUTs and block memories within FPGA. Because both are
SRAM-based structures [12], [13]. This work is a comple-
mentary study to cover latches and FFs, as well as LUTs and
block memories.
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Fig. 3: Three typical implementations for static latch. 1) SR
latch similar to SRAM cell with special transistor sizing. 2) D
latch based on SR NAND latch. 3) D latch by pass transistor
logic. Our technique is applicable to all cases.
III. STRUCTURES OF JLATCH AND JFF
A. Circuit Description
Structure of a static latch is rather similar to SRAM cell,
where two cross-coupled inverters hold stable opposite values
by feedback loops, ’0’-’1’ or ’1’-’0’. However, access circuitry
and transistor sizing in some implementations are quite differ-
ent than SRAM cell. Three typical latch implementations are
shown in Figure 3. To store a value into a latch, in (1), the
value is pushed inside which requires proper transistor sizing,
similar to SRAM cell. But, in (2) and (3), to write a new
value, the feedback loop is broken by setting the enable input.
JLatch technique is applicable to all cases in Figure 3.
JLatch (Joint Latch) is constructed by connecting outputs of
four static latches like a ring by means of four joiner switches
as depicted in Figure 4. Each joiner connects two internal
nodes of two distinct latches to each other, here Q1 to Q2,
Q2 to Q3, Q3 to Q4 and Q4 to Q1. Provided that the joiner
type and size, and the size of latch transistors are appropriately
selected, this structure has two stable states: all four latches
Fig. 4: JLatch is a reconfigurable hardened static latch imple-
mented by joining outputs of four latches like a ring. When
CTRL=1, latch 1, 2, 3, and 4 form a single radiation hardened
latch with internal data redundancy, meaning Q1=Q2=Q3=Q4
and Q1=Q2=Q3=Q4.
Fig. 5: JDFF (Joint D Flip-Flop) is built from two JDLatches
(Joint D Latches) on the left. This structure provides four
separate normal DFF or a single radiation hardened DFF.
Conventional TMR technique on the right.
store ’1’ (Qi=’1’, Qi=’0’) or all store ’0’ (Qi=’0’, Qi=’1’).
Any other state immediately goes to one of these two stable
states. The logic behind this idea is that the coupled nodes
which hold redundant values, electrically support each other if
any instability threatens either one of them. Each latch receives
a direct support from two adjacent ones. For example, latch
1 is supported by latch 2 and latch 4 (Figure 4). In some
latch/FF designs a buffer is placed at output. In those cases,
the joiner switches should be placed before output buffers to
connect internal nodes of feedback loops to each other.
In normal mode, switches (joiners) are off. Therefore,
latches 1, 2, 3, and 4 are four separate ones which store
independent values without interfering with each other. When
reliability becomes a concern, the joiner switches can be
turned on (user sets CTRL=1) to join the latches together.
In this mode, ring of four latches constructs a single but more
robust latch. All four latches keep redundant data values. As
typically master-slave FFs are built from two level-sensitive
latches, JFF (Joint Flip-Flop) is also built from two JLatches
to form one robust FF from four normal FFs. In Figure 5-left,
one JDFF (Joint D Flip-Flop) is built from two JDLatches
(Joint D latches), where four normal DFFs can be traded-off
for having one hardened DFF. This is somehow similar to
prevalent hardware redundancy techniques like Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) as shown in Figure 5-right. This will be
discussed later.
B. Joiner Switch and transistor sizing
As discussed in [2], for selecting proper joiner switch, both
PMOS and NMOS transistor types with different W/L sizes
have to be analyzed. Simulation results show that NMOS has
superior performance over PMOS. Moreover, wider transistor
provides better connectivity and better mutual support. Mini-
mum size of joiner depends on size of latch transistors, but in
most of the cases NMOS1 or NMOS2 are enough (NMOSX
is X times wider than minimum sized NMOS).
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Fig. 6: If CTRL=1, node capacitance and discharging path (for
discharging collected charge) of node Q2 is added to node Q1.
Traditionally in standard CMOS gate design, pull-up and
pull-down networks are sized unbiasedly to have equal high-
to-low and low-to-high worst-case delay. On the other hand,
SRAM cells require special transistor sizing for proper func-
tionality, in which pull-down transistor is around four times
stronger (two times wider) than pull-up [1]. As the reason will
be explained in auto-correction section, in a similar approach
that we had in [2] for SRAMs, our solution requires a biased
transistor sizing for the inverters or gates inside feedback loop
of static latch. One of the pull-up or pull-down transistors has
to be at least two times stronger than the other. The latch (1)
in Figure 3 has already such necessary sizing, but for other
two, size of transistors inside data retention feedback loop
should be adjusted accordingly. In the cases that latch/FF’s
biased output voltage is not acceptable, output buffers which
are used in many practical designs can solve the issue.
C. Soft-Error Mitigation
Critical charge (Qcrit)—the maximum tolerable amount of
collected charge by a particle strike without changing the cell
value—is a measure of soft-error sensitivity of circuit nodes.
Node capacitance and its charging/discharging time constants
(τ ), determine value of Qcrit. In JLatch (and JFF), when
joiners are active, redundant nodes are coupled to each other.
Therefore, capacitance and discharging path of another node
is added to the node suffering from a radiation hit (Figure
6). In this way, node capacitance is increased which leads
to more stability. Additionally, parallel pull-down (or pull-
up) transistors discharge the collected charge faster. Therefore,
overall a stronger particle is needed to flip the cell. Simulation
shows that depending on static latch structure, the increase in
Qcrit is at least three orders of magnitude (1000X). Because of
exponential relation between Qcrit and Soft Error Rate (SER)
[4], we can practically say this structure is immune against
SEUs.
If the four latches to join are in a safe interleaving distance
to avoid MBU effect [9], JLatch can withstand against MBUs
effectively as well, but obviously with additional wiring cost.
Information about dies of existing FPGAs is commercial
secrets and not publicly available. However, considering the
size of circuits inside a typical FPGA logic block which
includes multiple LUTs and multiplexers [13], we expect that a
few latches or FFs can easily be interleaved (if are not already)
among other resources for having such a safe distance.
Fig. 7: Auto-correction mechanism in hardened SRAM cell
[2] is also applicable to JLatch and JFF, provided that size
of transistors are adjusted properly. Assuming ’0’ is stronger
than ’1’, a durable fault propagates from latch 1 to 4. Latch
2 and 3 are not affected and later will recover genuine values
of latch 1 and 4.
D. Auto-Correction and Fault Immunity
If we assume that faults are still probable inside JLatch
structure by any reason, our idea unveils another feature for
immediate correction of any single fault. The special transistor
sizing explained in section III-B, prevents fault propagation
inside the ring of four bits. Later, after disappearance of fault
source, faulty bits are recovered instantly. In the first latch in
Figure 3, which is similar to standard SRAM cell, sizing is
already biased where’0’ is stronger than ’1’. But in most of
latch/FF implementations such as the second and third ones
in Figure 3, transistor sizings are as normal CMOS gates and
not similar to SRAM cell. Hence, the JLatch technique is not
directly applicable to these, unless sizing of their pull-up and
pull-down networks are adjusted properly. For example, in the
scenario in Figure 7, a durable single fault occurs in latch 1
and then it propagates to latch 4, but not to latch 2 and 3.
Because weaker ’1’ values in latch 1 and 4 can not dominate
stronger ’0’ values in latch 2 and 3. Later, two intact bits push
and recover the two faulty bits. Simulation of auto-correction
mechanism for SRAM cell is presented in [2] and result is
similar to JLatch.
E. Overheads
We expect that timing and area overheads of additional
wirings for JLatch/JFF which are limited to be inside logic
blocks are negligible. This is due to long routing lines inside
FPGA’s complex interconnection network, low operational
frequency of reconfigurable fabrics, and relatively small size of
logic blocks. This technique requires one (two) extra transis-
tor(s) per latch (FF) as shown in Figure 4. For example, Xilinx
Virtex UltraScale XCVU440 contains more than 20 billion
transistors [18] and around 5 million CLB FFs. Therefore,
increase in total transistor count is trivial. Moreover, equipping
only some FPGA logic blocks with JLatch/JFF to protect
most critical parts of design, such as the processor running
diagnostics routines, can reduce the costs. As it had been
depicted in Figure 5, JDFF requires an identical data input for
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all four FFs. This is done by normal FPGA routing resources,
similar to what is done for a typical TMR design.
F. Other Considerations
We assume that in normal mode, when CTRL=0 and the
JLatch/JFF technique is not applied, all individual latches and
FFs are free of process variation problems. On the other hand,
joiner switches are not very sensitive to process variation. If
their resistance is low enough, which often is achievable even
by minimum size NMOS transistor, they work as intended.
This was shown through simulation for different (W/L) tran-
sistor sizes in earlier study [2].
In this paper, we consider Latches and FFs (sequential logic)
in hold state. We do not consider Single Event Transients
(SETs) inside combinational logic which may generate a glitch
and then propagated into sequential logic. Although the SETs
are not relevant for our current work, our previous study which
covered SRAM cells [2] is applicable to LUTs and BRAMs
inside FPGA. It not only protects SRAM cell values, but also
damps the glitch amplitude originated from them.
IV. SIMULATION
A. Setup
We simulated our technique on Advanced Design System
(ADS) with 22nm predictive technology model library [14].
Transistor sizes for all latches of Figure 3 are selected as
follows: In all cases L = Lmin. For latch 1,(W/L)PD =
(W/L)PU = (W/L)joiner = 1 and (W/L)PG = 2. For latch
2, (W/L)PD = 2 and (W/L)PU = 1 for NAND gate, and
(W/L)joiner = 1. For latch 3, (W/L)PD = (W/L)PU = 1
for inverter, (W/L)PD = (W/L)PU = 2 for tri-state inverter
and (W/L)joiner = 2.
B. Simulation of SEU
The traditional method for measuring Qcrit via simulation,
is through injection of current pulse into circuit nodes. In
the literature, current pulse with various shapes such as
rectangular, triangular, and exponential is used to model SEU.
In our simulation setup, as illustrated in Figure 8, we inject
rectangular current pulse with variable width and amplitude
into victim nodes of latch L1. Two current sources shown in
the Figure, either inject a pulse into ’0’ node (Q1), or out
of ’1’ node (Q1). We run both cases and consider the worst
one. For every pulse width ranging from 0.1 picoseconds to
1 nanoseconds, pulse amplitude is increased up to the point
such that the whole JLatch flips. While it is still possible
that the injected current pulse corrupts the value of hardened
JLatch, the possibility is very low, due to significant increase
in required Qcrit.
Simulations are performed for three latches in Figure 3 and
their hardened versions while they are in hold state. In Figure
9, the achieved improvements have been depicted. The y-axis
is maximum tolerable amplitude of injected current pulse, for
every pulse width on x-axis. For all three cases, the required
pulse amplitude (or equivalently required Qcrit, as it is the
area under pulse shape) is at least three orders of magnitude
Fig. 8: Particle strike is modeled by current injection into
circuit nodes. Both nodes of memory bit are tested while latch
is in hold state.
(1000X) larger than what is needed to flip the simple latches.
Table I shows the Qcrit values.
TABLE I: Critical charge of normal and proposed joint
latches for pulse width=1ns.
L1 L2 L3 JL1 JL2 JL3
Qcrit (fC) 8 18 15 32000 3450000 17000
SER = K × φ×A× exp (−Qcrit
Qs
) (1)
Considering critical charge values in Table I, we assume that
such extremely high energy particles with this capability are
very rare and therefore, we conclude that for realistic scenarios
JLatch (and then JFF) is fully immune against any single
particle strike while it is in hold state. Equation 1 expresses
the SER in terms of Qcrit [4]. The SER by cell decreases
exponentially with Qcrit and then, according to Qcrit values
shown in Table I, the joint latch has a SER that is practically
equals to zero, which implies its full immunity against particle
strikes. K is a proportionality constant, φ is the neutron flux
with energy greater than 1MeV, A is the sensitive area of the
Fig. 9: Improvement achieved by hardening latch implementa-
tions of Figure 3. The y-axis is maximum tolerable amplitude
of injected current pulse, for every pulse width on x-axis.
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circuit and Qs is the charge collection efficiency of the device,
in fC.
C. Comparison with TMR
In the literature, there are some well-known hardening solu-
tions like DICE [3] as discussed in section II. But due to large
and fixed overheads, they are only applicable to special and
none-commercial products. However, our solution is recon-
figurable and applicable to commercial-grade FPGAs. Hence,
they are not directly comparable. We compare JLatch/JFF with
TMR which is a well-known user-level technique implemented
in user’s HDL code.
In TMR, unless the majority voter is also replicated (which
imposes large overheads), reliability is still a concern due to
the voter failure which directly affects the output. However, in
JFF, no explicit single point of failure hardware voter exists,
thereby eliminating such concerns. Moreover, the delay of
voter is not added to critical path like conventional majority
voters. In Figure 10, the delay of normal DFF, TMR DFF, and
JDFF (as was shown in Figure 5) with implementation of latch
3 (as was shown in Figure 3) are compared for Vdd ranging
from 0.5V to 0.9V. Delay is measured as the time between
clock edge and the time in which output signal reaches Vdd/2
while a minimum size inverter is at output as load. Delay
is selected from maximum of low-to-high and high-to-low
values. As the simulation results show (see Figure 10), the
voting delay is significantly reduced form 50%-80% in the
case of TMR DFF, to 10%-20% in the case of JDFF. This is
mainly due to the fact that voter is not in series at output as
it is the case in usual voting architectures.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose JLatch and JFF, novel and simple
circuit techniques for achieving a flexible trade-off between
available resource size (number of user latches and Flip-Flops)
and reliability inside FPGAs. With special circuit design,
significant improvement in critical charge (Qcrit) is achieved
Fig. 10: Comparison between delay of a normal DFF, a
triplicated DFF with a majority voter at output (TMR
DFF), and a JDFF. The voter delay is reduced form
50%-80% in TMR DFF, to 10%-20% in JDFF.
to practically bring immunity against SEUs. Moreover, pro-
vided that special transistor sizing is applied, JLatch (and
JFF) presents a novel self-correcting technique to immediately
correct any occurrence of single faults to avoid degradation
of redundancy. Additionally, by this technique, the delay of
majority voter as it exists in conventional replication tech-
niques such as TMR, is significantly reduced. Area overhead
for having flexibility of these structures is only one extra
transistor per normal static latch (two extra transistors per
normal master-slave Flip-Flop).
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